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The period from the New Zealand Wars to the South African War can best be described as one of uncertainty. The belief that the native rebellion had been successfully concluded was a minority opinion, as was the view that the international situation was of little importance to New Zealand's security. The majority of colonists held the view that the resumption of the New Zealand Wars was likely. It was also widely believed that New Zealand's shore was extremely vulnerable to foreign aggression. As Major Atkienson so succinctly stated in the House Of Representatives:
"They did not know when there might be war either
internally or externally..."
In retrospect, it is easy to dismiss threats to New Zealand's security in the latter half of the nineteenth century as mere flights of colonial fantasy. Hindsight provides critical commentators with the indisputable knowledge that peace was maintained.
It was however, a paranoia based on real concerns not flights of imaginative fantasy. The colonists of New Zealand had, in the 1860's, followed the exploits of the confederate privateers 'Alabama',
Florida' and 'Shenandoah' with interest. They knew, without doubt, that a solitary vessel designed for speed, that was well armed and fuelled, could easily descend upon their shores, threaten shipping and destroy ports.
New Zealand's awareness of its vulnerability to small-scale raids, was to be a constant concern throughout the century. The governmental response to this concern was a series of defence committees and reviews. On re-examination of the nation's external defence requirements, the committees recommended the
installation of heavy gun batteries, complete with an integrated torpedo system. However, little was actually done until the mid 1880's. In
part this was due to cost but it was also due to perceptions of responsibility. New Zealand, as a
self-governing colony, had been forced to accept self-reliance for
internal security but maintained that Britain should continue to take responsibility for defending the colony from external aggression.
It was felt that Britain should bear such responsibility as New Zealand would only face an external aggressor as the result of Britain becoming involved in a war with a European power rather than through any action of its own. If Britain could not defend New Zealand from such aggression, then it was felt, by some at least, that an independent kingdom should be established so that any war involving Great Britain would not automatically involve New Zealand. Most, however, would have preferred to have an independent squadron of the British Navy stationed in the colony to secure its shores.
Britain was, however, unable to guarantee the security of New Zealand's shore from every eventuality. While accepting the responsibility of securing the whole Empire against strategic threat, the British authorities made it abundantly clear that they could not prevent isolated attacks by small, fast, well-armed raiders.
British short comings in providing total security reinforced the feeling of vulnerability that most New Zealand colonists already had. Coupled with growing tensions amongst the European powers and the extension of their rivalries into the Pacific, New Zealand was gradually forced out of its complacency.
France, Germany, the United States as well as the continually growing menace of Russia, loomed as potential aggressors. Russia, with its expansionist policy, its practice of sending its modem naval vessels on long distance training voyages, and its threatening base at Vladivostock became the predominant
external threat.
Though none could accurately predict when Britain, and therefore New Zealand, might be involved in war, by early 1878 no one doubted that war with Russia was imminent. The Russian army had advanced
on Istanbul; in response the British fleet cleared its decks for action in the sea of Marmora, recruited the Brigade of Guards up to war strength and reinforced both Malta and Gibraltar. Such signals meant only one
thing to New Zealand, war between Russia and Britain. Of more immediate concern was the Russian purchase of three merchant ironclads from the United States.
The three ships, the State of California, Columbus and Saratoga were refitted and renamed as the Warships Europa (Europe), Asiia (Asia) and Afrika (Africa). In addition, Russia ordered the construction of a fourth ironclad at the Crumps shipyard. When news of these purchases leaked, New York insurance brokers raised premiums for British shipping by a further two percent and the Admiralty ordered its vessels at Bermuda and Halifax to be ready to cruise the North American coasts if required.
In response to the escalation of tensions, the New Zealand Government finally took action for the defence of its shores. It ordered twenty-four artillery pieces at a cost of f:44,000. Before these guns arrived, however, the British
and Russian tensions were eased by the agreement reached at the Congress of Berlin. With the threat of war receding the New Zealand
Government declined to take any further action for its own external defence.
British authorities, however, took more positive action by establishing the Colonial Defence committee and setting up a Royal
Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Carnarvon. Created to enquire and report on the defences of strategic colonial ports, these bodies undertook the first detailed examination of Imperial defence requirements in the nineteenth century. The commission developed further the concept of colonial
self reliance in defence and noted that, while the Royal Navy was responsible for the protection of British trade on the high seas, protection of colonial harbours was the responsibility of the respective colonial governments.
New Zealand had little choice but to accept these policy-guidelines as the government had declined to send a delegation
to the commission's hearings even though they had been invited to do so. The cabinet had decided to decline the invitation as they had not formulated a considered policy on coastal defence, a lack they were to overcome by
inviting Colonel Scratchley to report on New Zealand's defence needs.
In mid-February 1880, Scratchley wrote and presented his recommendations to the New Zealand Government in a 37 page report. To defend New Zealand's coast adequately against likely attacks, Scratchley recommended that fortifications be constructed utilizing the existing heavy artillery pieces and submarine mines. These installations, Scratchley believed, should be manned by a nucleus of regular servicemen supported by a reorganised Volunteer Force.
Volunteer units in the immediate hinterland of the principal ports, would be employed either as auxiliaries to the forts, or as members of a Mobile Field Force to counter small scale enemy landings. If a corps could not be employed immediately in the forts or Field Force, Scratchley recommended that they be disestablished.
In total, Scratchley believed, only 2,400 of the existing 8,032 Volunteers were required to defend New Zealand's principal ports.
To the annoyance of many, the government did not act immediately to implement Scratchley's recommendations. The government was determined to make haste slowly, arguing that Scratchley's report was not complete and they did not wish to take any ill-considered action. Underlying all this hesitancy of the government, was the need to retain the interior corps for use if the Maori insurgents resumed hostilities.
In sharp contrast to the reinforced and highlighted realization by New Zealand's colonists that their homelands ports and harbours were extremely vulnerable to external attack, was the resurgence of the internal threat. Though the last shots in the New Zealand Wars had been fired in May 1872, colonists were unsure whether they were truly in a state of
peace. Maori opposition to surveying and land sales was still widespread and many feared that a resumption of hostilities would occur. Fear of a renewal in hostilities with the Maori was most prevalent in the seats of the last war, Taranaki and Waikato. In Taranaki, for example, Parihaka loomed as a potential centre of rebellion.
In the Waikato the southern lands of the Ngati Mardapoto were seen as an asylum,
not only for the dispossessed and disgruntled Waikato Kingites, but also the fierce guerilla leader Te Kooti. Alarms and war rumours were a frequent occurrence for those living north of the Aukati
(confiscation line) which the Kingites enforced as a closed border.
This closed border was to be opened when the Waikato threat was finally
neutralized through negotiation. Lasting from early 1878 until mid-1881, the negotiations between the Kingites and the government climaxed when King Tawhiao rode into Alexandra on 11 July 1881 at the head of 600 warriors. With his chiefs and his followers, Tawhiao, symbolically laid down the weapons of war signifying to all that peace had been finally made.
Tawhiao's reconciliation, while easing tensions on the Waikato frontier, did not dispel the bogey of an internal threat to the colony's security. On the West Coast of the North Island a repeat performance of 1860 seemed to be in the offing with Parihaka taking the place of Waitara. Established on confiscated Taranaki land.
Parihaka by 1879, had become a citadel of Maori nationalist resistance to governmental authority. Under the joint leadership of Te Whiti and Tohu the residents of Parihaka. were determined to resist the European settlement of confiscated lands until adequate reserves had been set aside for the original Maori owners. Unlike previous resistance attempts, however, Te Whiti and Tohu were determined to avoid armed conflict.
The Governmental response to Parihaka, like the Waikato Kingites, was negotiation. It was not, however, a negotiation for peace at any price. At first Te Whiti was willing to accept the opening up of the land, so long as adequate reserves were defined and publicized.
The Government unfortunately proceeded with the survey without detailing the reserves. In response, Te Whiti and Tohu implerriented a campaign of civil disobedience. In March 1879, surveying parties were stopped, followed by the more notorious ploughing campaign in May.
Throughout Taranaki, European land was ploughed up by Parihaka residents. The cabinet was forced to prepare for war. In Taranaki itself new Volunteer corps were formed with over
1,500 new recruits under training within ten days of the commencement of the ploughing campaign. This forceful demonstration, seemingly designed to
bolster European confidence and cower the Parihaka dissidents, was ineffectual. Ploughing continued and the settlers demanded an escalation in the government's response.
To ease tensions, the Government established a commission to investigate
the Taranaki land question. Though Te Whiti refused formally to co-operate with the government's commission, his speech on 17 April 1880 to his followers was interpreted as a conciliatory one. It was less verbose than usual but its message was no less potent.
It advocated living in peace and quietness in the region. In response the government recommended the development of roading on the confiscated lands using the Armed Constabulary as navvies. Nothing was taken for granted, however, and Colonel Roberts, the local commander, organised the work as a military advance. His constables moved at a cautious rate and built military encampments on the line of their advance.
When the government offered Panhaka land for sale in February 1881 and received no bids whatsoever, it became a political necessity that a solution be found to the problem. This necessity increased as 1881 progressed. Taranaki settlers, their local newspapers and politicians demanded firm action from the government, action the government would have to take if it hoped to survive in the forthcoming general election.
In response, the authorities sent a circular telegram to district commanders calling for a return of volunteers prepared to serve on the west coast. The government had finally decided to assemble an overwhelming force to march against Parihaka, a force that would intimidate any opposition. By the end of October 1881, the force converged on the plains of Rahotu only three miles from Parihaka. Consisting of nearly 1,000 volunteers and over 600 Armed Constables, this assembly was a formidable army. Thirty-three individual units from throughout the colony had by 27 October 1881 been called up for active service.
Their chance to prove themselves came on 5 November 1881. Issued with two day's rations and forty rounds of ammunition the troops formed up into a large column and marched on Parihaka. As the column closed in on Pariluka it was met not by
gunfire but by singing children. Through this throng the advance party entered the centre of Parihaka seeking an assurance that its residents would desist from all further activity. When Te Whiti refused to comply, the riot act was read. At 11.30 the Armed Constabulary re-entered Panhaka and arrested Te Whiti and Tohu.
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They were immediately sent to New Plymouth, escorted by a squad of the Taranaki Mounted Rifles. Most perceived that Parihaka had settled the fear of a resumption of the New Zealand wars for ever.
With the Maori King submitting willingly to the authority of the government and Parihaka failing to ignite the flames of War, 1881 dearly marked the
demise of New Zealand's major internal security concern.
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Taranaki Mounted Rifles helmet plate |
Failure of the Parihaka
problem to ignite a general conflagration marked a major turning point for New Zealand defence policy. The government was able to shift its policy focus from the need to balance limited resources to protect against major threats from both within and without to concentrate more fully on the colony's external defence needs. The government, determined to carry out Scratchley's scheme, appointed a Board of officers under the chairmanship of Major-General A. G. Davidson on 1 March 1882.
The board's task was to examine the rules and regulations
governing the Volunteer Force and recommend any organisational restructuring required to implement
Scratchley's proposals. One of the major recommendations of the Board was the appointment of a commandant, preferably of the Royal Artillery, to help overcome the unsatisfactory administration of the existing defence structure. It recommended the establishment of the existing Volunteer Force and its replacement by a totally new organisation structured along the lines advocated by Scratchley.
To defend New Zealand's main harbours, the inquiry concluded that the colony required two regiments of cavalry, six regiments of
Infantry and one regiment of Artillery divided equally between the two main Islands. To be efficient administratively, the Board concluded, the twenty existing military districts should be reduced to six, three for each Island. The Board further argued for a
military force divided into two divisions (lines). The 'First Line', to provide supplementation to the permanent
forces stationed at the port fortifications, as well as the Field Force for mobile coast defence. The 'Second Line', to provide a reserve consisting, in the
main, of country units at too great a distance from the harbours to be of immediate use.
It was anticipated by the Board that the second line units would undertake a bare minimum of military training sufficient to provide a basis for further training if full scale mobilization was required.
In contrast, the First line units would be expected to enroll for a minimum of three years, reside within 25 miles of their Headquarters and undertake a rigorous training regime to ensure their proficiency if called upon.
In total, the Board envisaged a total force structure numbering 4,399. The First Line to consist of 2,572 while the Second Line were to number only 1,827. To train this lean force in its new role, the Board suggested that a School of Instruction and Musketry be established.
The only significant recommendation from either Scratchley or the Board's reports actioned in the short term, was the issue of a new set of general regulations. Using the draft set as a guide, the Defence
Department, under the personal supervision of the Minister, arranged for the issue of a new set of general regulations governing the Volunteer force to become effective from the 1
January 1883. Significant changes were brought about in the organisational structure,
administration and training of the Volunteer force. For the first time recruits signed on for a fixed engagement, not for the three years advocated by most
reforms but, for not less than one year, with three months written notice of resignation.
The minimum age for general recruits was raised from 17 to 18 years old. Those who wished to join or remain in the force were expected to undergo additional training to be
eligible for the capitation grant. In addition to the compulsory inspection parades, the Volunteers were required to undergo an examination in judging distances and fire two class practices on the rifle range. Officers and
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were also required to undergo additional training and testing. On top of the drill and administration examinations, officers from 1883 were required to pass examinations in minor tactics related to their particular arm.
NCOs, while still appointed under "the commanding officer's
authority", were required, for the first time, to pass examinations in drill, guard duties, administration and rifle practice.
Even the organisational structure that the Volunteers had been used to operating with changed. New divisions, foreshadowed by the persistent demands of reformers, were created. During the New Zealand War period a psychological division between the North and South Islands can be said to have existed. The 1870's had seen this division largely disappear, reflecting the slow unification of the colony's provinces into an embryonic nation. Scratchley, supported by the 1882 Board of Inquiry, recommended that a new division be instituted in the Volunteer Force; the
division between coast and country. A division between those units at the main ports, who would have to face any external threat, and those in the outlying districts considered to be
of no immediate utility. The 1883 regulations in essence implement
this recommended division.
The Volunteer Force was to be divided by two classifications, the Garrison and Country Corps. The Garrison corps were the embodiment of Scratchley's
Fort' and Field Force' units and the Boards 'First Line'. They were to defend the four main ports and their immediate economic hinterlands. The Garrison Corps establishment was laid down as a minimum of 43 and a maximum of 63 volunteers.
The Country Corps were those recommended by Scratchley for disestablishment and by the Board for
transformation into the Second Line. 'They did not have an explicit role, though it would appear that the intent of the regulations was that they should provide a reserve if required in an emergency.
Establishment changes were not the only innovation of the 1883 regulations. The permanent staff members attached to the Volunteer Force as administrators and trainers had several alterations made to their terms of reference. For the first time it became mandatory for all correspondence to go through the Military District Office. Permanent Drill Instructors became ineligible to hold
concurrent Volunteer commissions with their permanent paid employment.
An immediate result of the dramatic changes ushered in by the 1883 regulations, was the sought for reduction in the number of Volunteers. By 1884 the Volunteer Force numbered only 4,300 compared to the high of 8,000 in 1874. In the longer term, the
regulations of 1883 proved to be extremely beneficial for the Volunteer Force. The provisions implemented in 1883 were not to be dramatically altered for the rest of the century. In this the regulations of 1883 provided a stability and continuity so
important for any organisation. More importantly, they were judged by inspecting officers and the media to have instigated a new age of disciplined training that would lead to a marked improvement in the efficiency and usefulness of New Zealand's Volunteer Force.
The foundations laid by the 1883 regulations and Scratchley's
report were to be built upon over the next six years by governments influenced by Sir William Francis Drummond
Jervois. Jervois, the military mentor of Scratchley, was appointed as Governor of New Zealand in December 1882 and arrived in the colony in
January 1883 to take up his new office. While an experienced Governor, having served in the Straits settlement and South
Australia Jervois was primarily a defence consultant for colonial governments who saw it as his duty to advise his ministers on defence. For the six years preceding his arrival in New Zealand he had been engaged with Scratchley on devising schemes for the defence of Australia.
As soon as he arrived in the country, Jervois expressed his determination to take up the defence question and offered his military expertise to the government who were more than willing to have his advice. Within three months of becoming Governor, he had visited and examined the ports of Wellington, Auckland, Lyttelton, Port Chalmers and the Bluff.
Realising that Scratchley's initial work had been conceptual Jervois noted that
it was essential that a more detailed plan be devised. Unfortunately Scratchley was over-committed and could not personally do the task, so Jervois suggested that the government apply for the services of another experienced engineering officer.
Again the government was happy to accept
Jervois' advice and went so far as to allow him to arrange the application for a suitable officer. Having already decided what type of defence works New Zealand required, Jervois sought, with Scratchley's assistance, a competent officer to supervise the detailed execution of his plan. Major Cautley, another of
Jervois' understudies, was sent by the Imperial authorities and after consulting with Scratchley en route, arrived in New Zealand, briefed to recommend works devised by the Governor.
| Though able to obtain the services of a well qualified engineering officer, neither the governor nor the government was able to secure the services of a
currently serving Imperial officer to take up the appointment of commandant. As a result the government
offered the post to Colonel George Stoddart
Whitmore.>> Whitmore had proved himself, not only on the battlefield, but also on the Treasury benches. Before he was able to take up his new appointment, a unique piece of legislation had to be
drafted and passed through Parliament.
As a member of the Legislative Council, Whitmore would normally have vacated his seat on taking up the post of commandant. However,
Whitmore insisted that he be
able to return to politics and a compromise was found with the
'Whitmore Enabling Act of 1885'.
Under its to retain his
Legislative provisions, Whitmore was permitted to retain his
Legislative Council seat as well as hold the office of commander
of New Zealand's defence forces so long as he did not sit in the
chamber or vote in any of its divisions. |
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Once the Enabling Act had
become law Whitmore, promoted to -Major-General, took up his post and
began work on improving the efficiency of New Zealand's defence forces.
It would be easy to make exaggerated claims with regard to the
importance of the new commandant. On the surface at least, his reforms
appear be substantial and all embracing. Whitmore was after all the
commandant who was to establish a School of Military Instruction, it was
he who insisted on elected officers passing commission examinations
three months after their appointment, and it was he who arranged for the
establishment of Honorary Reserve Corps as a method of disbanding corps
stationed too distant from ports to be of immediate use.
Yet none of what Whitmore implemented
was novel or innovative. The 1882 Board of Inquiry had identified the
need for a Military School, while the 1883 Regulations required officers
within six months of their appointment to pass prescribed commissioning
examinations. Scratchley in his 1880 report and the 1882 Boards report
had both recommended the disbanding of country units, with the 1882
Board of Inquiry recommending that they be incorporated into the
reservist second line. While Whitmore was not important for originality,
he was still an important appointee; his importance lay in his ability
to refine, consolidate and, most importantly, implement existing policy
proposals.
Capitalizing on the renewal of interest in defence, Whitmore hastened
construction of the fortifications already commenced by Cautley for the
four main ports, organised administrative battalions for volunteer corps
and arranged for the passage of a new Defence Act through parliament in
1886. The new Act, for the first time, regulated all the branches of New
Zealand's Defence Forces under one law and transformed the Armed
Constabulary into the Police Force and Permanent Militia.
In the same year that the Defence Act
was passed, Whitmore issued yet another new set of regulations for the
control of the Volunteer Force. 1887 should have been the year of
fruition for Whitmore's reforms. The administrative battalions and
brigades had been in place for two years, the Defence Act of 1886 had
been law for one and his revision of the regulations became effective on
1 January.
Yet this year was to mark the beginning of the end. The economy went
into a major recession and demands for retrenchment in government
spending were heard throughout the colony. Following the lead of both
the New South Wales and Victorian governments, the New Zealand Minister
of Defence invited Major-General H. Schaw to review and report on the
colony's defence. Having been briefed to reduce expenditure to its
lowest Schaw reconsidered the question of New Zealand's defence
needs within limited means.
Consulting Whitmore and his staff,
Schaw was able to ascertain the existing forces available for defence
and form an opinion as to the absolute minimum required to protect the
colony, and to argue that, since the struggles with the interior Maori
tribes had ceased it was a waste of money to maintain any force for
internal defence. New Zealand was still, however, liable to attack from
external foes determined to obtain money, coals and stores as well as
inflict injury and humiliation on a portion of the British Empire.
Having accepted Scratchley's basic premises, Schaw went on to accept
that New Zealand, like any nation with an extended seaboard, was unable
to provide defence for the whole coast-line.
To be both efficient and effective,
defence resources had to be concentrated on the vital points, the main
harbours. For minor seaport towns such as Nelson, New Plymouth and the
like Schaw suggested that rifle clubs, which encouraged the art of
shooting, and honorary Volunteer Corps could provide the semblance of a
military presence. For Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton and Dunedin a
minimum force of 4,314 was required consisting of 343 Permanent Militia
and 3,982 Volunteers. As the Volunteers numbered 8,403 at the time of
Schaw's review, he was advocating a reduction of 4,421. More important
for the government than the reduction in numbers was the savings in
expenditure. Schaw's scheme would save approximately £27,500.
While Schaw advocated a reduction in
quantity, he balanced this by stressing the need for quality. The
Garrison Coast Brigade Volunteers, for example, would, under Schaw's
reorganisation, be required to undergo more advance training in the
special duties of serving heavy guns, laying submarine mines and long
torpedoes. When reviewed by the Imperial 'Colonial Defence Committee' in
April 1888 Schaw's plan was complimented and his proposed reductions and
alterations considered justified.
In the grips of a major economic depression and needing to curtail
costs, the government happily accepted Schaw's recommendations. It
also accepted the resignation of Major-General Whitmore as commandant. For
the government, Whitmore's resignation was a golden opportunity to save
more money and his position was allowed to remain vacant, with the
undersecretary of defence acting as a de-facto commandant.
Non-replacement of Whitmore was not the only cost saving measure pursued
by the government in the field of defence. The central School of
Instruction and the administrative battalion structure were abolished,
while the practice of issuing free railway passes to volunteers on duty
was discontinued.
Over the next three years defence suffered as a consequence of the economic downturn. This was to be reversed in 1891 when the liberals took the Treasury benches and Richard John Seddon the defence portfolio. Surprisingly, one of Seddon's first acts was further retrenchment. After a hurried tour of inspection of the colony's defence establishments, Seddon dismissed an under secretary, three Lieutenant-Colonels and several junior officers, making a further saving of
£4,800 per annum in salaries.
Seddon was not, however, simply trying to save money. His obvious intent was to have his department run as efficiently and economically as possibly. As soon as he had completed his disestablishment of positions, he regarded as surplus
Seddon ' devolved decision making to the lowest possible level and emphasised to the remaining employees that they were regarded a-;efficient and faithful servants. In response, those still on
the defence pay roll were credited with working with more confidence and vigour.
With his ministry refashioned to meet his needs, Seddon set about
revitalizing the Volunteer Force. To make the force more professional,
Seddon wished to see an Imperial officer, conversant with modem military ideas, appointed for a five year term as commandant. Such an appointee,
Seddon believed, would bring the requisite expertise to help upgrade and reinvigorate the Volunteer Force. Secondly, to ensure that the best candidates available rose to lead the country's volunteer units, Seddon proposed to replace
the bottom-up 'elective system of officer selection with a top-down nomination system.
The new system was to be
controlled by the new commandant using the services of the officers commanding the military districts.
Seddon also proposed changes to the funding formula for governmental capitation. Instead of a yearly grant apportioned by
Parliament, Seddon argued for a three year guaranteed minimum capitation to enable units to make long term financial
commitments without fear of overtaxing their resources.
Success in his endeavours seemed to come in 1892, when approval was given for the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel F. J. Fox to the post of commandant of the New Zealand Defence Forces. On his arrival Fox appeared to be the saviour the Defence Force was looking for. Instead of formally taking up his appointment Fox obtained the Premier's permission to travel the length and breadth of the country on a tour of inspection. Over a nine month period Fox examined all of New Zealand's installations, units and their officers, seeking out their strengths and exposing
their weaknesses for scrutiny. This immediate show of dynamism on the new commandant's part, while ultimately resulting in
significant improvements to New Zealand Defence forces initially unleashed a major political controversy.
The controversy was prompted by the publication in June 1893 of Fox's inspection report on the state of the colony's defences. Submitted in three parts between February and June 1893 th6report was one of most thorough inspections ever undertaken of
New Zealand's defences. Best described as a condemnation of the existing system, Fox's report was to result in a
polarization of both debate and public opinion on defence issues for the next three years. This result was exactly what Fox seemed determined
to achieve, as he believed the previous system of reporting was inaccurate, indeed incompetent. Such reporting,
he believed, had lulled the colony into believing its defence forces were more efficient than they in fact were. He saw it as his imperative
duty to dispel that belief..." In carrying out this self appointed task Fox, in clear and uncompromising language, highlighted
the deficiencies of New Zealand's whole defence establishment.
Only one unit, the Otago Hussars was in Fox's estimation
efficient. Fox went on to rub salt into the wound he had opened by commenting on all Volunteer Officers individually. Of the two
hundred and sixty-four commissioned officers serving at the time of his inspection Fox was able to classify one hundred and
ninety-six (seventy-five percent) as fair to very good. The remaining sixty-eight officers he damned as indifferent or bad.
In an endeavour to overcome the shortcomings of the Volunteer force, Fox argued that the existing regulations governing the force should be revised. For the defence of the colony, Fox believed a totally new defence scheme had to be evolved to meet the
current need. Fox's planned defence scheme, as with previous proposals, was designed to provide the colony with
adequate defence at minimum cost. Fox noted that for defence planning two conditions existed, either Britain retained supremacy of the seas and New Zealand, along with the rest of the Empire, remained fundamentally secure, or alternatively the British navy could not command the sea lanes and the Empire was lost, vulnerable to unannounced attack by any maritime aggressor.
To counter effectively the likely low level threats to the colony's security, Fox proposed a major restructuring of defence
organisation and administration. After carefully examining the colony's fourteen Military districts in both Islands, Fox recommended that they be reduced by amalgamation to four major districts centred on
Auckland Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, together with one minor district based on Nelson-Westland. (It was
not until February 1895 that this reduction in the administrative districts actually occurred). Fox argued that such radical restructuring would help concentrate defence efforts on the most likely targets of any attack, the four main centres and the strategic coal reserves of West Port.
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To defend each of these new districts
Fox advocated major changes to both the Garrison and Field force units. Fox, on completion of his tour of inspection, carefully assessed the
minimum manpower and equipment requirements to defend each district he had proposed.
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For Wellington he believed a 1228 man force, 1111 (ninety percent) of whom were to be Volunteers was needed.
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In Auckland he proposed a 1075 man force of whom 990 were to be Volunteers.
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Further south in Dunedin Fox argued that the district required a 1127 man force comprised of sixty-four permanent militia and 1063 Volunteers, while
in
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Christchurch
fifty-six permanent militia and 987 Volunteers were needed for its defence.
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Across the Ranges in the
smaller district of Nelson and Westland he believed one hundred and ninety-one men, of whom only two were to be
permanent staff should be able to protect the important coal reserves.
The colony's volunteers, under the scheme proposed by Fox, would number only 4,340 approximately two thousand less than were at that time
enrolled. To make the necessary manpower savings Fox recommended the disbandment of forty-one (40 percent) of the existing one hundred and two units. In the main, these units were country corps which Fox believed were of little immediate use and were thus a
drain on the limited financial and material resources available for defence in New Zealand.
To make the most efficient use of resources available Fox argued in favour of an armament replacement programme, changes to training programmes as well as organisational restructuring. The worn out,
unserviceable and often dangerous Snider rifles, Fox argued, must be replaced immediately. Fox noted that New Zealand appeared incapable of training its troops effectively. The officers were unskilled commanders, incapable of acting as instructors and the permanent force instructors were out of date, over worked and as a consequence, generally inefficient.
Fox argued that for training to improve, the
government would have to appoint at least six additional Imperial Staff
officers and instructors. To give encouragement to individual volunteers Fox urged the government to increase capitation as well as provide personal bonuses for Volunteers attending encampments of three or more days.
Individual training by itself was not, however, sufficient. Individual efficiency had to be harnessed and to do this Fox recommended that units be organised into higher formations. Noting that the Artillery corps had already been organised into a single regiment Fox proposed to join together the independent Infantry and Mounted Units into battalions. With such a structure manned by well equipped and trained troops, Fox was confident the nation could defend itself against low level threats.
However, he was adamant that his
proposals be seen as an integrated scheme that could not have its individual components tampered with. As he himself said: "...all the recommendations are intimately connected, and the cutting out of one or the reducing of any of the expenditure proposed will at once alter the whole scheme..."
Purely as a scheme of defence for the colony, the proposals put forward by Fox were well conceived. When they were
critically examined by two other military experts with experience in New
Zealand, Jervois and Schaw, they along with the author were praised. Fox's scheme was also economic; if carried out it would
have resulted not only in immediate improvements in defence preparedness, it would also have saved money. Though the proposed scheme was cost effective, it did
not receive unanimous support in the legislature or the colony. Fox, though an able
military officer, was an inept politician. His attacks on individual officers and units when made public unleashed an unparalleled controversy in the history of the defence debate in New Zealand.
The two opposing views on Fox and his report were expressed vehemently in Parliament and press. Taking sides the media took the controversy to the people. Those newspapers which
opposed the report and especially the adverse reporting of the 68 officers, titled them
'Fox's Martyrs".
Unfortunately the media supporters of Fox were unable to come up with such an emotive catch phrase. Attacked both in the press and in Parliament, Fox decided to resign. His resignation, in fact, came before he had officially taken up his appointment as commandant. Though he resigned as commandant, Fox remained as the Government's military advisor. His
report had highlighted defence weaknesses that all recognised needed to be
addressed. To address these weaknesses, Seddon called together a conference of 22 selected officers, including Fox, to discuss defence.
This conference, under the chairmanship of Whitmore, met in Wellington for eleven days during late September and early October 1894. The recommendations of the
conference numbering only twenty-six in total, were a summary of those
made by almost every inspector of New Zealand defences.
As soon as the conference submitted its findings, Seddon commenced an intimate study of their recommendations on regulations, with a view to incorporating them into the set he was working on, as well as
making any amendments to legislation that were necessary. Within five months Seddon, with Fox's assistance, was able to promulgate a revised set of defence regulations and have
amending legislation ready for submission to Parliament for approval.
The regulations themselves were gazetted
on 28 February 1895 to come into force on 1 March of that year. In form, they were almost identical to the preceding sets of well over a decade. The only discernible change, in line with the recommendations
of both Fox and the Volunteer officers conference, was made to establishments. All units, except Naval or Garrison Artillery were to be allowed a maximum of sixty and a minimum
of forty personnel. For Naval and Garrison Artillery Units the maximum was to be 100 with the minimum being sixty.
For each of the four districts, Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, an establishment of 790 men was laid down. These establishments were to consist of 1 Mounted Corps, 3
Naval or Garrison Artillery Corps, 1 Field Artillery Corps, 1 Engineer Corps, a Rifle Corps and a Garrison Band.
The immediate result of the restructuring and implementation of changes recommended by Fox and the Volunteer officer conference, was a marked improvement in New Zealand's defence capability. Taking the opportunity of the discernible improvement in the state of New Zealand's military forces and the return of Lieutenant-Colonel Fox to the United Kingdom Seddon, on 22 June
1886 handed over the defence portfolio to Thomas Thompson.
To replace Fox the Liberal
ministry once again asked the War Office, through the Governor, to provide a suitable officer to command the colony's forces. In response to this request the War Office recommended Major Arthur Pole Penton, like Fox, a highly regarded artillery officer. The War Office's nominee was accepted and Penton was offered, and accepted, the appointment of commandant for five years.
Arriving in late 1896, Penton was gazetted in his new appointment and quietly began to assess the colony's defence requirements and how they were being met.
Like all his predecessors, Penton had some major concerns after reviewing the colony's defences. He argued that defence preparations consisted of much more than purchasing guns, torpedoes, associated equipment and constructing strong emplacements and fortifications. From his own inspection of the forces in early
1897 he perceived several deficiencies that required to be remedied immediately.
If action was not taken, the colony would be forced to rely for its security on a Volunteer Force that was not only inefficient, but also inappropriate for its role.
According to Penton, the force undertook insufficient
and inadequate training for its officers and men. It lacked an essential feature of all defence forces, a practised and experienced higher command; worst of all it, could not function for any prolonged period in the field as it had no logistics tail or medical support services
While Penton had a dearly defined policy plan to instill military professionalism into, what he considered, the colony's inadequate defence forces,
by itself this would not have achieved anything. His itemisation of the defences of the forces was not novel nor were his solutions. Penton, however, like
Major General Whitmore, was to be extremely fortunate in the timing of his appointment. 1897 was to see the commencement of a major revival of interest in New Zealand's Defence Forces.
For New Zealand, and indeed the whole of the British Empire, 1897 was to be the year of the 'Diamond Jubilee. A year marked by celebrations and monuments to Victoria, who at seventy-eight had been Queen of England, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India and ruler of the British Dominions beyond the seas for a record sixty years. To ensure that the record reign would not be forgotten, the Imperial authorities invited the colonies to send military contingents to the planned public commemorations ceremonies in London in mid-June. In response to this invitation,
New Zealand sent a fifty-four strong contingent, the first colonially raised military contingent to leave its shores.
The importance of the contingent to the development of New Zealand's Defence Forces was out of all proportion to its size. Not only did it assist in raising public awareness of New Zealand's Volunteer Force, it also provided a model for mobilization, training, selection and despatch of military contingents. A model that was to be
well used over the succeeding five years.
The involvement of the Volunteer Force in supplying men for the Jubilee Contingent, was to have a profound effect. General interest in defence and the Volunteer force was revived after years of public indifference. The Defence Department was inundated with offers of service of new corps from throughout the colony.
The year 1898 was a further year of promise and ogress for defence. New Zealand's citizens, Penton was
glad to observe, had finally begun to take a genuine interest in the military position of the colony. They desired to see their politicians and military advisors put 'the defences and the forces of the colony into a trustworthy and efficient state'. The newspapers, aware of the renewed interest, pioneered the concept of defence being a national non-party issue.
All peoples and politicians should strive to ensure a proper scheme for the defence of the state, a call that politicians heard and quickly acted on. Impetus for the growing interest in the colony's defences was not simply a
flow on from that generated by Jubilee fever. It was the result of
internal as well as international conflicts and conquests. The first, and
probably least significant, was the so called 'Dog Tax War' in Northland.
Hone Toia of the Mahurehure hapu of the Ngapuhi lead a disgruntled group of Maori determined to oppose the dog tax levied by the
Hokianga county. In response, the central government sent a detachment of one hundred and twenty men of the Permanent Militia under the command of
Lieutenant Newall to maintain the peace. At the same time arrangements were made to raise an expeditionary force of one hundred picked men from the Volunteer units of Auckland.
Of greater importance for the growth in interest in the colony s defences was the marked growth in international tension. The need for Britain to join with other powers in defensive alliances was highlighted for New Zealanders at least, by the success of the United States in its war against Spain in 1898. It was not that the United States directly threatened the nation's
security, more it was the lesson it hammered home.
Spain had been defeated relatively quickly without once being attacked in its European homeland. All attacks had been directed at her most vulnerable points, her colonies and dependencies. For the few in New Zealand
who viewed the colony's isolation as adequate protection, the American success was a shattering experience. For the majority who had always seen New Zealand as vulnerable by its distance from Britain and its dependence on the sea lanes, America's success was yet another timely reminder. If Great Britain were to go to war with a European adversary she, like Spain, would be attacked at its most vulnerable points, her far flung colonies, like New Zealand. Realising this, civic leaders were quick to demand that the central government upgrade the colony's coastal defences.
In response to the growing awareness of New Zealand's vulnerability, its colonists once again took the trouble to organise themselves into Volunteer units. In 1898 no fewer than
seventy-one proposed Volunteer Corps sought permission from the Defence Department for formation. The government, in an apparent attempt to foster the revival of interest in defence, approved a new establishment for the Volunteer force which allowed capitation to be paid to a total of 7,000 men, which, according to Penton, effectively meant the force could expand up to 8,000 men when non-efficients were taken into account.
Attempting to maximize the potential benefits from the revival, the government, through a defence committee in conjunction with senior military officers, re-examined and inspected the
country's defences and completed the drawing up of a defence scheme. Penton had commenced preparation for the defence
scheme in 1897 on his arrival in the colony. In it, all key
installations and how they were to be defended were identified. Units were given responsibility for specific tasks and were also informed on how they were to mobilize in case of emergency.
This revised scheme, however, was quickly outdated. Events in South
Africa were to overshadow New Zealand's local defence preparations. The mentality of
Fortress New Zealand was to be replaced by forward defence. New Zealand was to become a full participant in the British defence alliance with its provision of
contingents for service on the veldt. |
