The Boer or Afrikaaner inhabitants of Southern Africa, trace their origins back to Dutch, French and German Huguenot settlers of the mid 17th century. By the mid 19th century they had become a rugged, self-sufficient and independent people at odds with the British settlers and in conflict with African tribes. When the British government assumed the administration of the Cape Colony following the Napoleonic Wars, a large number of Boers set out on their Great Trek to the north. There they founded two Boer republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, but there was to be no escape from further clashes of interest and problems of sovereignty with Britain, clashes that would eventually lead to war.
The first clash of arms went well for the Boers. Under the command of Major General Sir George Coffey, Britain sent, in 18801881, an
expeditionary force tasked with annexing the Transvaal. The campaign was badly managed and the British were soundly defeated
at Majuba Hill and forced to withdraw, leaving the Boer government intact and the British inhabitants of South Africa dismayed.
When gold was discovered in the Transvaal, its problems multiplied as foreigners (Uitlanders), mostly British, poured in. Soon outnumbering the original
Boer inhabitants, the Uitlanders. demanded the right to vote and changes in the laws and taxation. A misguided attempt to assert Uitlander claims by force - the
fated Jameson raid of 1895 - was easily crushed. Tension rose as the threatened Boers, with the encouragement of European powers, resisted British demands and strengthened their armouries. In September 1899, the Transvaal
Boers began mobilising and most Uitlanders fled the country. War seemed inevitable.
The British Government was as resolved upon confrontation as
their Boer counterparts. British subjects everywhere, they asserted, had a right to
protection. The severity of Boer rule, including their attitude towards the blacks, was condemned. Boer intransigence and arrogance hardened British attitudes, and support for settlement of the dispute by resort to arms if necessary was overwhelming in Britain and its
self-governing colonies. The Boers were no less willing to take up arms. They anticipated foreign intervention on their behalf, overlooking in this respect the importance of British sea power, and believed that Britain would shrink back from the effort in lives, time and money that would be required to defeat them.
War began on 11 October 1899, between Transvaal and Britain with the Orange Free State immediately joining their Boer kith and kin. At first the Boers held the initiative. Although liked by his men, General Sir Redvers Buller, the first British commander, was hesitant and irresolute, in the habit of changing his mind at the height of battle and blaming others for defeats. British tactics were rigid and unimaginative, seeking formal, almost set piece, battles. Their enemy was more flexible. Magnificent horsemen and familiar with the country, they became adept at harassment and irregular warfare. Within months the British were besieged
at Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley, and had suffered defeats at Magersfontein, Stormberg and Colenso.
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| Queen's
South Africa Medal |
King's
South Africa Medal |
On the British side, firmer direction was obviously needed. In January 1900
Field Marshal Lord Roberts took over the command of British forces, with General (later Lord) Kitchener as his chief of staff. As British troops and supplies built up, and the Boers remained fundamentally defensive in their strategy, the British position steadily improved. Roberts was soon in a position to take the offensive. While Boer forces in east and west were held,
strong British columns advanced on a broad front northwards from Cape Colony, rolling up the Boer centre.
The plan worked admirably and the Boer capitals were both soon in British hands. The besieged towns were relieved and the Boer leader, Cronj6, captured with 5000 of his troops. Within a year of the beginning of hostilities, the end seemed in sight and the British confidently expected an early peace. Roberts returned to England, leaving Kitchener to wind up the operations.
But the Boers refused to give up, and the war took on a more bitter aspect as they turned to guerilla tactics, attacking British rail supplies, blockhouses and isolated
columns. A series of brilliant raids inspired Boer resistance. Kitchener's response was
two-fold: he sought first, to reduce the scope of guerilla operations by establishing lines of blockhouses
and, second, to remove the sources of food and shelter available to the Boer commandos.
The country was gradually cleared of people and stock.
Farms were destroyed and the Boer population moved into concentration camps, where atrocious conditions caused many deaths,
especially among children. This policy was not initially successful for the Boers under
arms, thus relieved of the need to provide for their dependents, had their hands freed, but the removal of their means of sustenance and the continuing British military operations finally began to have effect. On 31 May 1902 the hungry, ragged and
ill-armed Boer remnants accepted the inevitable and surrendered at Vereeniging. Throughout the whole of the South African conflict New Zealand was to be an active participant on the side of Britain.
On 28 September 1899, two weeks before war was declared, Seddon sought
approval from Parliament to offer a New Zealand contingent for service with the British Army in the Transvaal. Seconded by the leader of the parliamentary opposition, Russell (who was actually sympathetic to
the Boer position), the proposal overwhelming support. In the House, the vote was
fifty four to five in favour, while in the council it was thirty-six to one. In less than a month, the Imperial authorities had accepted New Zealand's offer and the
first contingent of 214 men was despatched to establish a worthy fighting tradition. When the contingent left Wellington on 21 October 1899, it was
farewelled by an enthusiastic crowd of between forty and sixty thousand well wishers.
To the immense delight of all New Zealand, this force was the first colonial contingent to arrive
at Cape Town in late November. The enthusiasm shown for the departing contingent was in the space of two months transferred to the ballot box. In 1899, Seddon once again had to face the electorate and to his, and the opposition's, astonishment he was swept back to power with a majority of 30 when it was previously predicted he would lose. The results of the December poll were chiefly attributed to the decision to despatch a New Zealand contingent for service in Transvaal. New Zealanders, it seemed, were more than happy
with the governments endeavours to strengthen Imperial bonds by way of an active military alliance.
Given a clear mandate from the public, Seddon was more than willing to give further assistance to
Britain after the gloomy news of "Black Week" reached the colony. This week of military disasters that befell the Imperial Forces in Southern Africa between 9 and 15 December 1899 strengthened Imperial resolve to defeat
the Boer commandos.
Immediately following "Black
Week' New Zealand's first contingent, with only rudimentary training, was thrown into action firing its first shots in anger on 18 December.
At the same time in New Zealand, preparations were commenced to send a second contingent. Sailing on 20 January 1900 the second contingent reached
South Africa late in the following month. This was followed over the next two years by a further eight contingents.
In total 6,495 men, together with 8,000 horses, were to serve in the war. As New Zealand's commitment to the war increased, its ability to provide trained men decreased. These first two contingents consisted almost entirely of men from New Zealand's existing Volunteer Force. As further contingents were required, more and more men had to be recruited
from those without any previous military training. Increasingly the only criteria used for selection were the ability to ride and shoot straight.
While the war was being conducted on the veldt, New Zealand's Volunteer Force was suffering at home due to the large scale
commitment of men, material and time to the departing contingents. The commitment to the war effort Meant that much needed administrative
support and instructional staff were unavailable to meet the ongoing demands of the Volunteer Force. All readily acknowledging the short
term disadvantages to the Volunteers, and noting they would continue for as long as New Zealand had its commitment to South Africa, it was however argued by politicians and senior members of the Defence Department that the predicted long term benefits would make it all worthwhile.
Exacerbating the problems of a Volunteer Force bereft of permanent staff support, was the massive expansion it experienced. In one year alone, 1899 to 1900, the Force swelled by sixty-three percent (7,000 to 11,444 enrolled members). This explosive expansion threatened to snap the already overly stretched defence infrastructure. Lack of staff meant that some newly raised country units had no provision for training. The
same lack meant that no worthwhile training could be undertaken at encampments notable only for their record attendances.
For Colonel Penton, the commandant, this situation, while posing a major problem, also provided more useful ammunition for his campaign to have the School of
Instruction re-established. Determined that the Force continue to increase its field training, Penton argued that the best way of overcoming staff shortages was to train the Volunteer Force command element at a central School of Instruction. With defence issues being politically
popular it is not surprising that Penton's desire for the re-establishment of the central school was finally taken up in Parliament. Considered a popular as well as beneficial measure, agreement was reached to have the School re-established.
Acceptance, albeit belatedly, for the need of a School of Instruction by
New Zealand's politicians was another manifestation of the general growth of interest and awareness of defence by Parliament. Another indication of this growing interest was the
decision by the Premier, Seddon, to renew his personal association with the Defence Department. On 23 January 1900 he once again took responsibility for the defence portfolio. A third indication that defence was an issue worthy of attention was the instigation of yet another review of the colony's security precautions and preparations.
This review was initiated by a defence statement tabled by Seddon in July. It was undertaken by a Joint Defence Committee formed from both Houses given the task of
investigating all matters affecting the defence of the colony. Prompting this activity by the legislative were two basic factors. The first, obviously, was the war being waged on the veldt. The second was the resurgence in
Britain, with a consequential spill-over to New Zealand, of invasion paranoia. A paranoia fuelled by British regular troops being withdrawn from the homeland for service in Southern Africa.
In his July defence statement, Seddon intimated that he believed the defence forces of the colony should be expanded
in both size and scope. He believed that they should also be divided into five categories; the Permanent Artillery, the ordinary Volunteers, an Imperial Reserve Force for service with British Regulars, Rifle Clubs and the Cadet Corps. Using Seddon's vision as a guide, the joint Defence Committee
reviewed current policy and had its report read b August. In it, the committee recommended that all offers
of service by prospective Volunteer corps be accepted. For New Zealand's volunteers this meant further expansion. The overtaxed Defence Department had to organise the growth of the Volunteer Force from an already swelled establishment of 11,444 in one hundred and fifty units to 17,000 in two hundred and
thirty.
Support for the continued expansion of New
Zealand's Volunteer Force was not universal. Some members of the parliamentary opposition, for example, were quick to point out that defence was not improved by putting numbers on rolls. The increase in numbers they noted was not paralleled by an increase in the number of competent officers or
non-commissioned officers. Rather than simply increasing the number of corps in the
establishment, it would be better, they argued, to increase the maximum number allowed for existing corps. This, it was hoped, would mean that key personnel would at least know the rudiments of their Military work.
It was also questioned whether an increase in the size of the Volunteer Force should occur. Many, including Russell and Penton, believed that New Zealand's strategic situation had not changed from those outlined by Scratchley in 1881. It would be, therefore, cheaper and more effective if a large contribution was made to the Royal Navy rather than financing an expansion of the local Volunteer Force, a force which they believed would have little utility if New Zealand found itself at war.
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Australians and
New Zealanders at Klerksdorp, 24 March 1901 |
Opposition to the planned expansion
of the Volunteer Force was however unsuccessful. Seddon, the main architect of expansion, had perceived that the enthusiasm shown by the public for
volunteering was an outward or physical manifestation of patriotism, a patriotism that was sweeping the country as a result of interest and support for the South African War. It was also a spirit that had secured the treasury benches for his ministry in 1899 and he was determined to foster it for political reasons.
In addition to sending contingents to South Africa to fight, New Zealand sent two contingents to Australia. One of
seventy three mounted rifles, to take part in the Federation celebrations. The other, consisting of
two hundred and fourteen representatives from all areas, to take part in the celebrations marking the
opening of the first Federal Parliament in Melbourne. In Australia a combined
Imperial and Indian Army contingent had also taken part in the Federation celebrations.
On the invitation of the New Zealand government this combined contingent took the opportunity to visit the colony. While here, they put on splendid military demonstrations from one end of the country to the other. Penton hoped that for the total cost of
£4,000 required to transport, accommodate and feed them, their presence would raise the spirit of rivalry within New Zealand's Defence Forces as well as provide a standard to emulate.
The standard set by the Imperial and Indian forces was soon matched. During the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York a spectacular review was held in Christchurch on 24 June 1901. Four hundred and thirty officers, seven thousand three hundred and thirty five men and two thousand nine hundred cadets came together from throughout both Islands in the largest muster of men under
arms ever held in the colony. Then, on a small scale, the scene was repeated at each district headquarters the royal couple visited.
While the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and Yorks
visit was a joyous occasion that practised New Zealand's Volunteers in massed mobilisation, the other royal happening of 1901 was mournful. On 22 January 1901 Queen Victoria had finally succumbed to death.
Queen Victoria's demise was almost symbolic, a symbolism matched by the transitional nature of 1901 for the Volunteers of New Zealand. At the end of the year they were to see not only a new monarch, but also a new commandant. Penton was to be replaced by a South African war veteran,
Major General James Melville Babington. Babington was highly regarded, not only as a thinker, but also as a tactician; the colony looked forward to his arrival.
Babington officially took command of the forces on 23 January 1902. Though a new commandant, in a new year, with a new monarch on the throne, Babington faced the same problems as his predecessor. Babington, as Penton and so many before him, noted that the greatest weakness of New Zealand's Defence Forces was their training. Like Penton, Babington wished to see more outdoor training, with musketry practised at unknown
ranges.
He also wished to see progressive formation training starting with the smallest unit and working up, to ensure that all levels of command were capable of fulfilling their roles in the field. To
maximize the use of training resources, Babington scrapped, what the
considered, the wasteful Easter Encampments. In their place, he wished to see unit training corps, conducted by officers and non-commissioned officers who had undertaken courses at the Central School of Instruction. Though in 1902 Babington faced the same basic problems as his predecessors, it was also definitely the end of an era. Not only was a new king crowned but the South African War was concluded.
Casualties: During the war, 288 New Zealanders died. 59 of whom were killed in active service, the remainder dying as a result of
accident and disease. In addition 166 New Zealanders were wounded. |
